ological," "primal," and "mythic" language with which Heidegger "defin[es]" housing , and rightly alert to the real housing problem, rather than mere "'false'" or "'bad reading,'" indicated by Heidegger's remarkable (in his own words, nonfigural ["keine Übertagung"]) equation of "language" with "the house of Being" (a most non-Nietzschean extension of a phrase possibly borrowed from Zarathustra) , it is her discussion of Heidegger's texts that remains in the main periphrastic, a cautiously conservative restatement rather than questioning of the inordinate, one might even say parodic, role of housing (as language's own signified) in Heidegger's identification, in discourse, of discourse with ontology. Still, these quibbles regarding intermittently classicizing theoretizations aside-after all, if it weren't hard to do, and, moreover, hard to find, we wouldn't call it walking on the wild side-not taking the walk on the "Martin Heidegger Rundweg" is not even an evasion of this kind, unless walking it were less like circling "a haunted house in the depths of the forest" (155) than avoiding a Schwarzwälder version of the theme scene from "The Sound of Music." In Housing Problems, Bernstein demonstrates convincingly she knows these two scenarios can become one, that "actual" housing can not only constitute but, more "spookily," "collapse" them (155), and that the relationship of writing to architecture both indicates that "suffocating" (155), truly Gothic possibility at every turn and, maintaining the difference between writing and architecture, as between housing and signification, keeps it in mind. For all it brings to mind, Housing Problems constitutes a significant work of reflection on a critical relationship too often occluded even when indicated, left unthought, and for that reason, for all its worries, a brave one.
Princeton University Claudia Brodsky
Chenxi Tang This remarkable book is divided into two major portions: either one could readily have served as a book unto itself. In the first half, Tang maps out the broader discursive shifts that lead up to the formation of the geographical science most commonly associated with Alexander von Humboldt. The opening chapter places Tang's central thesis in relation to Reinhart Koselleck's characterization of the Sattelzeit and the emergence of a modern semantics of history around 1800. Tang argues that the historicization of society was coupled with the discovery of modern geographical space. The first chapter outlines discursive shifts in the discipline of geography across the eighteenth century. The second and third chapters expand the argument to demonstrate how lyric poetry and Idealist philosophy contributed to geography's methodological transformation.
German scholars have long focused on the description of landscapes and urban densities in literature. Kate Rigby's Topographies of the Sacred is but a recent, ecocritical example. Chenxi Tang seeks not only to foreground spatial relations within romantic poetry, he also explains the intellectual basis upon which geography became a new field of knowledge. In order to explain the discipline as it emerges around 1800, Tang distinguishes between the descriptive geography of classical epistemé, with its moral classification of the empirical world, and modern geography, with its sensitivity to cultural history and the perspectives of individual observers. Lyric poetry, Tang argues, became a privileged medium for describing nature. He contrasts the landscape descriptions in Albrecht von Haller's alpine poetry with Goethe's highly subjective "Auf dem See" (1775). Goethe's poem is neither a mimetic nor iconic representation of an empirically recognizable place, whereas Haller's cycle, "Die Alpen," is just that. At this stage in his argument, Tang is recapitulating David Wellbery's thesis from The Specular Moment asserting a revolutionary rupture between Goethe's youthful lyric and previous pastoral poems.
The breadth and innovation of Tang's argument shows itself as he quickly moves on to Alexander von Humboldt's conceptualization of nature as an organic unity, followed by Carl Ritter's argument for the dynamic unity between man and earth. "Die Erde" is a central term in Tang's history of geography, and he draws out its many connotations in a wide range of important German texts. Like Wellbery, Tang starts off sounding like Foucault, but then moves back into the reflective waters of German Idealism.
Tang stresses the importance of bodily orientation within the world, stating that the experience of space is a fundamental mode of being (131). The spatial, cartographic investigations of the late eighteenth century belong to the broader emergence of anthropological thought, both in terms of cultural history and personal psychology. Although he cites modern textbooks on the subject, Tang is really more interested in anthropology's emergence at the end of the Enlightenment. Immanuel Kant well understood the anthropological need to orient oneself physically, to distinguish one side of the body from the other, and to thereby locate empirical things in relation to our material selves. In the mode of later Idealists, Tang argues that beyond this initial orientation of ourselves lies the larger question of the direction of our geometrical position. In other words, is there an absolute space beyond our immediate connection to empirical objects? What happens when one asks about the relationship of finite things within the vast possibilities of abstract space? While he incorporates Kant's 1786 essay "What Does It mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?" Tang is much less interested in Kant's scrupulous efforts to establish boundaries beyond which reason cannot safely explore. In the grand debate between Herder's cultural anthropology and Kant's transcendental reason, Tang moves consistently away from Kant, whom he characterizes as positing a mode of thought that hovers above geography. Yet one might complicate Tang's image of the Enlightenment by recalling how very much Kant relies upon geographical metaphors to justify his epistemological project.
Idealist revisions of Kant are much more Tang's concern and he provides one of the clearest accounts of Schelling's differences with Fichte I can recall reading. He then expands the already complex understanding we have of Novalis and science through his reading of "Die Lehrlinge zu Sais." For Novalis, the cartographer studies nature much as the poet or the philosopher, by watching and then copying its dance into figures, so that a map is said to "capture" the spirit of nature. Nature becomes sensual once again through the drawing and interpretation of maps, for these cartographic documents help wanderers to inhabit the earth (157). Tang elaborates his concept of habitation, so similar to Heidegger's dwelling, through Humboldt's scientific and Hölderlin's poetic accounts of the interaction between human cultivation and the environment. Ultimately this description of a landscape in terms of its inhabitation produces a geographic understanding of history. To flesh out this summary would itself require more space on the page, suffice it to say that Tang has written a brilliant book, and as a reader, I have gained immensely for having spent a summer pondering its implications.
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